Anomalous Monism in Carnap's Aufbau

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    The Logical Reconstruction of the World (Aufbau) is one of the major works of Rudolf Carnap in which he attempts to put an end to some of the traditional disputes in epistemology by using what he calls `construction theory'. According tot his theory, one or more constructional systems can be designed in which all the scientific and pre-scientific objects are logically made out of a limited number of basic elements. Carnap introduces some options for the basis of this system and chooses the domain of the autopsychological, i.e., the domain of private elementary experiences, among them and tries to construct all the concepts out of them. This phenomenalistic reduction sometimes is seen as embracing a Cartesian dualism of mind and body or even a mentalistic monism. However, in this paper, I shall try to show that the traditional dualist-monist debates are among those disputes that the construction theory aims to get rid of. I will show that Carnap's position on the mind-body problem is really close to what Davidson later termed as `Anomalous Monism' and that this is why Carnap fails to complete his logical construction at a crucial step.“Whenever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities” (Bertrand Russell).