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ARTICLE

Hypothetico-Deductivism is Still Hopeless

  • Pages : 229 à 234
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  • DOI : 10.1023/B:ERKE.0000012881.0366
  • URL : Lien externe
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  • Date de création : 04-01-2011
  • Dernière mise à jour : 04-01-2011

Résumé :

Français

Since Christensen refuted the Bootstrap theory of confirmation in 1990, there have been some trials to improve the Hypothetico-Deductive theory of confirmation. After some trials, Gemes (1998) declared that his revised version completely overcame the difficulties of Hypothetico-Deductivism without generating any new difficulties. In this paper, I will assert that Gemes's revised version encounters some new difficulties, so it cannot be a true alternative to the Bootstrap theory of confirmation and to classical Hypothetico-Deductivism. Also I will assert that, in principle, such new difficulties cannot be overcome by any trials dependent only on formal logic.

 

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