Système d’information en philosophie des sciences
Information system on philosophy of science

ImprimerEnvoyer le lien

ARTICLE

How Not to Argue for Incompatibilism

  • Pages : 1 à 26
  •  
  •  
  • DOI : 10.1023/B:ERKE.0000005087.3315
  • URL : Lien externe
  •  
  • Date de création : 04-01-2011
  • Dernière mise à jour : 04-01-2011

Résumé :

Français

Ted A. Warfield has recently employed modal logic to argue that compatibilism in the free-will/determinism debate entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. I show that Warfield's argument fails. A parallel argument leads to the false conclusion that the mere possibility of determinism, together with the necessary existence of any contingent propositions, entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. The error in both arguments involves a crucial equivocation, which can be revealed by replacing modal operators with explicit quantifiers over possible worlds. I conclude that the modal-logical apparatus used by Warfield obscures rather than clarifies, and distracts from the real philosophical issues involved in the metaphysical debate. These issues cannot be settled by logic alone.

 

Haut de page

Retour à la page précédente

Mentions légales © SIPS, 2022.
Dernière mise à jour : Lundi 05 décembre 2022