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Understanding the Influence Theory of Causation: A Critique of Strevens

  • Pages : 101 à 118
  • DOI : 10.1007/s10670-005-0607-x
  • URL : Lien externe
  • Date de création : 04-01-2011
  • Dernière mise à jour : 04-01-2011

Mots-clés :

Résumé :


In this paper, I will first clarify Lewis’s influence theory of causation by relying on his theory of events. And then I will consider Michael Strevens’s charge against the sufficiency of Lewis’s theory. My claim is that it is legitimate but does not pose as serious a problem for Lewis’s theory as Strevens thinks because Lewis can surmount it by limiting the scope of his theory to causation between concrete events. Michael Strevens raises an alleged counterexample to the necessity of Lewis’s theory that, if successful, would have a very important advantage over other alleged counterexamples. But I will assert that it is simply mistaken. My defense of Lewis’s theory will shed interesting light on the relationship between Lewis’s theory and Salmon’s mark theory.


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