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ARTICLE

The Real Puzzle From Radford

  • Pages : 29 à 46
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  • Support : Electronic document
  • Edition : Original
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  • DOI : 10.1007/s10670-004-4701-2
  • URL : Lien externe
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  • Date de création : 04-01-2011
  • Dernière mise à jour : 06-06-2011

Résumé :

Anglais

In this paper, I will argue that Radford’s real question is not the conceptual one, as it is usually taken, but the causal one, and show that Walton’s account, which treats Radford’s puzzle as the conceptual question, is not a satisfactory solution to it. I will also argue that contrary to what Walton claims, the causal question is not only important, but also closely related to the conceptual and normative questions. What matters is not that Walton has not solved Radford’s puzzle per se, but that he has not recognized the importance of this puzzle. While doing this, I will suggest a revision to the cognitive theory of emotion.

 

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