Système d’information en philosophie des sciences

The Stability Theory of Knowledge and Belief Revision: Comments on Rott

MECHTENBERG Lydia

Dans : ERKENNTNIS - 2004 / 2-3 (N° 61)

Pages : 495 à 507
Support : Electronic document
Edition : Original
DOI : 10.1007/s10670-004-9321-3
URL : Lien externe
Date de création : 04-01-2011
Dernière mise à jour : 02-06-2011

Mots-clés :

Résumé :

Anglais

In this commentary on Rott’s paper “Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge”, the author discusses two problems of the stability theory of knowledge which are pointed out by Rott. She concludes that these problems offer no reason for rejecting the stability theory, but might be grounds for deviating from the standard AGM account of belief revision which Rott presupposes.

Mots-clés :

Résumé :

Anglais

In this commentary on Rott’s paper “Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge”, the author discusses two problems of the stability theory of knowledge which are pointed out by Rott. She concludes that these problems offer no reason for rejecting the stability theory, but might be grounds for deviating from the standard AGM account of belief revision which Rott presupposes.