Système d’information en philosophie des sciences
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Lotteries And Contexts

  • Pages : 415 à 428
  • Support : Electronic document
  • Edition : Original
  • DOI : 10.1007/s10670-004-9274-6
  • URL : Lien externe
  • Date de création : 04-01-2011
  • Dernière mise à jour : 02-06-2011

Mots-clés :

Résumé :


There are many ordinary propositions we think we know. Almost every ordinary proposition entails some lottery proposition which we think we do not know but to which we assign a high probability of being true (for instance:I will never be a multi-millionaire entails I will not win this lottery). How is this possible – given that some closure principle is true? This problem, also known as the Lottery puzzle, has recently provoked a lot of discussion. In this paper I discuss one of the most promising answers to the problem: Stewart Cohen’s contextualist solution, which is based on ideas about the salience of chances of error. After presenting some objections to it I sketch an alternative solution which is still contextualist in spirit.


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