On the Prospects for Virtue Contextualism : Comments on Greco

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Article

    • Pages: 401 to 413
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    • Support: Electronic document
    • Languages: Anglais
    • Édition: Original
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    • ISSN: 1572-8420-61-2/3
    • DOI: 110.1007/s10670-004-9285-3
    • URL: External link
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    • Creation date: 04-01-2011
    • Last update: 20-02-2012

    Abstract

    Anglais

    John Greco has proposed a new sort of contextualism which exhibits a principled grounding in an agent reliabilist virtue epistemology. In this paper I will discuss Greco’s two main reasons in favor of virtue contextualism. The first reason is that his account of knowledge can be derived from a more general theory of virtue and credit. The second reason consists in the thesis that a virtue contextualist solution to the lottery problem is superior to standards contextualism. With regard to the first claim, I raise some questions concerning the status and the content of the crucial conditions for Greco’s theory of intellectual credit. With regard to the second claim, I try to show that his arguments do not succeed in establishing the superiority of virtue contextualism to standards contextualism. I close with some remarks on the relation among Greco’s virtue contextualism, the traditional approach to the theory of knowledge and the proper domain of contextualism.