Système d’information en philosophie des sciences
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ARTICLE

A Different Sort of Contextualism

  • Pages : 383 à 400
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  • Support : Electronic document
  • Edition : Original
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  • DOI : 10.1007/s10670-004-9280-8
  • URL : Lien externe
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  • Date de création : 04-01-2011
  • Dernière mise à jour : 02-06-2011

Résumé :

Anglais

A number of virtue epistemologists endorse the following thesis: Knowledge is true belief resulting from intellectual virtue, where Ss true belief results from intellectual virtue just in case S believes the truth because S is intellectually virtuous. This thesis commits one to a sort of contextualism about knowledge attributions. This is because, in general, sentences of the form X occurred because Y occurred require a contextualist treatment. This sort of contextualism is contrasted with more familiar versions. It is argued that the position: (a) yields a better solution to the lottery problem, and (b) may be grounded in a more general theory of virtue and credit.

 

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