Système d’information en philosophie des sciences
Information system on philosophy of science

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ARTICLE

Are Knowledge Claims Indexical ?

  • Pages : 257 à 281
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  • Support : Electronic document
  • Edition : Original
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  • DOI : 10.1007/s10670-004-9276-4
  • URL : Lien externe
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  • Date de création : 04-01-2011
  • Dernière mise à jour : 02-06-2011

Résumé :

Anglais

David Lewis, Stewart Cohen, and Keith DeRose have proposed that sentences of the form S knows P are indexical, and therefore differ in truth value from one context to another. On their indexical contextualism, the truth value of S knows P is determined by whether S meets the epistemic standards of the speakers context. I will not be concerned with relational forms of contextualism, according to which the truth value of S knows P is determined by the standards of the subject Ss context, regardless of the standards applying to the speaker making the knowledge claim. Relational contextualism is a form of normative relativism. Indexical contextualism is a semantic theory. When the subject is the speaker, as when S is the first person pronoun I, the two forms of contextualism coincide. But otherwise, they diverge. I critically examine the principal arguments for indexicalism, detail linguistic evidence against it, and suggest a pragmatic alternative.

 

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