How to be an Anti-Skeptic and a NonContextualist

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    • Pages : 245 à 255
    • Support : Electronic document
    • Langues : Anglais
    • Édition : Original
    • ISSN : 1572-8420-61-2/3
    • DOI : 10.1007/s10670-004-9288-0
    • URL : Lien externe
    • Date de création : 04-01-2011
    • Dernière mise à jour : 02-06-2011



    Contextualists often argue from examples where it seems true to say in one context that a person knows something but not true to say that in another context where skeptical hypotheses have been introduced. The skeptical hypotheses can be moderate, simply mentioning what might be the case or raising questions about what a person is certain of, or radical, where scenarios about demon worlds, brains in vats, The Matrix, etc., are introduced. It is argued that the introduction of these skeptical hypotheses leads people to fallaciously infer that it is no longer true to say that the relevant person knows. The author believes that that is a better explanation of the so-called intuition that the person does not know than the contextualists who claim that raising these skeptical hypotheses changes the standards that determine when it is true to say S knows that P. At the end he raises the possibility that contextualists might defend their view on pragmatic rather than skeptical grounds by arguing that the standards of evidence rise when more is at stake in a practical sense.