Système d’information en philosophie des sciences
Information system on philosophy of science

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ARTICLE

Skepticism, Information, and Closure: Dretskes Theory of Knowledge

  • Pages : 187 à 201
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  • Support : Electronic document
  • Edition : Original
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  • DOI : 10.1007/s10670-004-9283-5
  • URL : Lien externe
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  • Date de création : 04-01-2011
  • Dernière mise à jour : 01-06-2011

Résumé :

Anglais

According to Fred Dretske’s externalist theory of knowledge a subject knows that p if and only if she believes that p and this belief is caused or causally sustained by the information that p. Another famous feature of Dretske’s epistemology is his denial that knowledge is closed under known logical entailment. The author argues that, given Dretske’s construal of information, he is in fact committed to the view that both information and knowledge are closed under known entailment. This has far-reaching consequences. For if it is true that, as Dretske also believes, accepting closure leads to skepticism, he must either embrace skepticism or abandon his information theory of knowledge. The latter alternative would seem to be preferable. But taking this route would deprive one of the most powerfully developed externalist epistemologies of its foundation.

 

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