Externalism and Modest Contextualism

Envoyer le lien


    • Pages : 173 à 186
    • Support : Electronic document
    • Langues : Anglais
    • Édition : Original
    • ISSN : 1572-8420-61-2/3
    • DOI : 10.1007/s10670-004-9277-3
    • URL : Lien externe
    • Date de création : 04-01-2011
    • Dernière mise à jour : 01-06-2011



    Externalism about knowledge commits one to a modest form of contextualism: whether one knows depends (or may depend) on circumstances (context) of which one has no knowledge. Such modest contextualism requires the rejection of the KK Principle (If S knows that P, then S knows that S knows that P) - something most people would want to reject anyway - but it does not require (though it is compatible with) a rejection of closure. Radical contextualism, on the other hand, goes a step farther and relativizes knowledge not just to the circumstances of the knower, but to the circumstances of the person attributing knowledge. I reject this more radical form of contextualism and suggest that it confuses (or that it can, at least, be avoided by carefully distinguishing) the relativity in what S is said to know from the relativity in whether S knows what S is said to know.