A Problem in General Philosophy of Science: The Rational Criteria of Choice

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    • Pages : 73 à 89
    • ISBN : 978-1-4020-9367-8
    • DOI : 10.1007/978-1-4020-9368-5_3
    • Date de création : 04-01-2011
    • Dernière mise à jour : 22-02-2015



    The question of the criteria involved in scientific choice is recurrent in philosophy of science. It has received attention in recent research and is not unrelated to several hotly debated issues: realism, truth, progress. The need to motivate decisions occurs in all areas of scientific inquiry. Thus the criteria of choice belong to a general philosophy of science, such as measurement or the structure of theories. By drawing attention to a question that cuts across disciplinary boundaries, we do not advocate the unity of science or a return to positivistic conceptions. We merely note that general questions arise, despite the fact that philosophy of science is branching off more and more into a series of distinct explorations of the various sciences. Those who adopt the disunity of science are not dispensed from having to explain interdisciplinarity. While new sciences emerge, each with its specific agenda, methods and techniques are transposed from one specialty to another.