Système d’information en philosophie des sciences
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ARTICLE

Experience and Perceptual Belief

  • Pages : 5 à 19
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  • DOI : 10.1007/978-1-4020-9338-8_1
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  • Date de création : 04-01-2011
  • Dernière mise à jour : 21-02-2015

Résumé :

Anglais

Are perceptual experiences reasons for perceptual beliefs? The act/content ambiguity of the term ‘belief’ carries over to this question. It is argued, following Popper, that experiences are reasons as well as causes for belief-acts, but not for belief-contents. This involves rejecting justificationism, the mistaken view that a reason for a belief-act must be a reason for its content. Popper's many critics presuppose justificationism, and so miss the main point of his solution to the problem of the empirical basis of science.

 

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