Système d’information en philosophie des sciences
Information system on philosophy of science

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ARTICLE

Guest Editor’s Introduction

  • Pages : 1 à 8
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  • DOI : 10.1007/s10670-006-9033-y
  • URL : Lien externe
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  • Date de création : 04-01-2011
  • Dernière mise à jour : 04-01-2011

Résumé :

Français

Since our visual perception of physical things essentially involves our identifying objects by their colours, any theory of visual perception must contain some account of the colours of things. The central problem with colour has to do with relating our normal, everyday colour perceptions to what science, i.e. physics, teaches us about physical objects and their qualities. Although we perceive colours as categorical surface properties of things, colour perceptions are explained by introducing physical properties like reflectance profiles or dispositions to cause certain experiences in normal human perceivers. Hence, it seems as if colours as they are experienced by us have no place in the physical world, because they are fundamentally different from the properties which we ascribe to physical objects in scientific accounts of colour perceptions. This special issue on perspectives on colour perception presents new suggestions to solve to this major problem.

 

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