In this article some less well-known aspects of Beth’s general philosophical ideas are reviewed and connected with each other, viz. his views on the perspectives for a new systematic philosophy, on the identity of humanities, and on the role of philosophy and science with respect to culture and life. The resulting picture is that Beth did have a rather sophisticated view on the identity of the humanities. By means of a distinction between “method” and “mode of thought” (beschouwingswijze), he defended their objectivity and, at the same time, the ineliminable role of an account in terms of intentions. Beth’s “scientific philosophy”, on the other hand, has a double face : it is a philosophy of science and scientific philosophy of life. The perspectives for a scientific philosophy of culture and life appear to be limited, however, as Beth came to recognize implicitly. In all these respects, Beth’s views have been developed in close connection with his intellectual environment, as is shown, notably in (critical) interaction with H.J. Pos.