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Against Probabilistic Measures of Coherence

  • Pages : 335 à 360
  • DOI : 10.1007/s10670-005-4002-4
  • Date de création : 04-01-2011
  • Dernière mise à jour : 04-01-2011

Résumé :


It is shown that the probabilistic theories of coherence proposed up to now produce a number of counter-intuitive results. The last section provides some reasons for believing that no probabilistic measure will ever be able to adequately capture coherence. First, there can be no function whose arguments are nothing but tuples of probabilities, and which assigns different values to pairs of propositions {A, B} and {A, C} if A implies both B and C, or their negations, and if P(B)=P(C). But such sets may indeed differ in their degree of coherence. Second, coherence is sensitive to explanatory relations between the propositions in question. Explanation, however, can hardly be captured solely in terms of probability.


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