À partir du paradoxe selon lequel la science découvre une réalité objective, qu’elle n’invente pas mais à l’élaboration de laquelle elle participe (modèles formels, techniques expérimentales), tant et si bien que cette réalité semble être construite de toute pièce par la science, l’A. étudie ce qu’est la réalité scientifique dans la plupart de ses champs. – L’œuvre de la science est à la fois de formuler les configurations du réel, de les construire et de les “penser”. Cette activité de penser possède trois aspects spécifiques : – représenter l’expérience en “symboles”, – suivre des règles, mais aussi échapper à des règles préétablies pour en créer de nouvelles et figurer des exceptions, – déterminer des critères de validité de la connaissance. C’est dans l’explicitation du sens commun de ces réalités concomitantes que la philosophie des sciences remplit l’une des tâches qui contribue à lui valoir son titre de philosophie. – Ouvert par un Préambule («De l’être au réel : le réel, concept moderne») qui situe historiquement la notion actuelle de réalité, l’ouvrage se divise en trois sections : – la première, «Les sciences formelles et la réalité», concerne la logique et la mathématique; – la deuxième, «Les sciences de la réalité empirique», est consacrée aux sciences du monde physique et aux sciences du monde humain; – la troisième, «L’imagination conceptuelle», met plus particulièrement l’accent sur le moment imaginatif de la science dans sa constitution d’un réel. M.-M. V.

The relation between scientific knowledge and common knowledge is a relatively new philosophical problem; it emerged with the rapid development of empirical science based on mathematics and experimental methods. One of by-products of that development is scientific realism claiming that the world is such as science reveals it to us. However if the world is as science presents it, then, what is the value of common knowledge and what role does common knowledge play in human cognitive activity ? Another question is whether common knowledge precedes in any significant sense scientific knowledge, or is it merely a guide to some of our daily activities with no relation to scientific cognition ? Perhaps it is a burden which, if possible, should be discarded as it makes gain knowledge of what the world is really like difficult. Is it possible that the very question about the relation between scientific knowledge and common knowledge is for some reasons ill-formulated and has no sense whatsoever? The aim of the present book is to search for answers to those questions. M.-M. V.

Extracted by C. D. Broad from papers published in Inquiry, Vol. I, no. 2, 1958. M.-M. V.

This paper deals with the problem of epistemic circularity to which it proposes a solution that is based on an account of common sense inspired by one branch of virtue epistemology. It explains why there is no need to be afraid of the notion of self-confidence in epistemology, and shows that a strong distinction between common knowledge and scientific knowledge may be seen as mistaken. The postulation of a profound division between these two kinds of knowledge has been a French speciality in recent years, inspired by Gaston Bachelard’s notion of an «epistemological break». This distinction is disputable in the epistemological perspective favored by Roger Pouivet.

This essay examines the similarities between the meaning of the adjective “common” in the expressions “common law” and “common sense”. The working hypothesis is that the juristic meaning of “common” could have influenced the philosophic one. The author concludes that “common” in “common law” and “common” in “common sense” are fairly cognate in their meanings.

The paper focuses on the different concepts of “common sense” and investigates this diversity through an examination of its ancient and modern equivalents. One thing that it is worth noticing, though, is that contemporary areas of science such as philosophy of science, artificial intelligence, psychology, social science, linguistics, ethnomethodology, or philosophy of ordinary language also exhibit the “common sense” phenomenon.

This paper deals with the pressing question of how to understand the current relationship between the sciences and common sense. It is necessary to relate the idea of common sense and that of science to more numerous dimensions than that of the couple, in itself already quite complex, of theory and fact. This is one of the tasks of contemporary epistemology. – False theories and common sense; – Models and common sense; – The engineering sciences; – Modelling. – [Translated by Steven Corcoran].

There is a dynamic interdependence between those two kinds of human knowledge : common knowledge and scientific knowledge. First, scientific knowledge is dependent on common knowledge, which is its source and support. Second, scientific knowledge is more effective and reliable and in this limited sense superior to common knowledge. Scientific knowledge provides intellectual enrichment and leads to technological advances. Third, applied and popularized scientific knowledge is taught at schools and partly incorporated into common and technical knowledge (development). But, fourth, common knowledge is the ground to supervise the consequences of science to avoid adverse effects like environmental degradation. Common knowledge is usually the ground for our activities, so it also supervise scientific practices.

This paper discusses the relationship between science and common sense in the philosophy of Canadian catholic theologian and philosopher Bernard Lonergan, especially in his opus vitae : Insight : A Study of Human Unserstanding (London, 1957. Toronto : The Critical Edition, 1992). It deals with the similarities and differences between science and common sense and also seeks the answer to the question of what kind of relation exists between them (conflict, cooperation, or indifference). To discuss Lonergan’s position, Monika Walczak addresses the following issues : – 1. B. Lonergan’s philosophical achievements and influence; – 2. A general account of his philosophy; – 3. The notion of science; – 4. The notion of common sense; – 5. Relations between science and common sense (similarities, differences, complementarity).

Cet article est une tentative de «localisation» de la pensée de Meyerson qui, selon l’auteur, occupe une place centrale dans «le moment 1900 en philosophie», entre ces deux figures majeures que sont Bergson et Brunschvicg. Le fil conducteur qui relie les philosophes français à ce moment 1900 serait «le problème du sens commun» : comment se peut-il que la perception nous donne la réalité et en même temps nous la voile ? Fondée sur un refus commun du positivisme, la solution apportée par Meyerson serait singulière : à une question métaphysique de la théorie de la connaissance, Meyerson aurait proposé de répondre en se situant dans le domaine de la philosophie de la science et de l’épistémologie.

La théorie mathématique de la décision individuelle n’est-elle que la mise en forme de la conception psychologique ordinaire de l’action, du désir et de la croyance ? En étudiant les systèmes de Franck P. Ramsey et de Leonard Savage, et leur modèle du pari, l’auteur répond par la négative. Contre Donald Davidson, il défend également l’idée que la théorie de la décision améliore la psychologie du sens commun en parvenant à s’affranchir de certaines de ses limitations. T. B.-K.