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Introduction to the theory of knowledge
Daniel John O’CONNOR, Brian CARRÉditeur : The Harvester Press Ltd. (England) - 1982
The Consequences of Pragmatism. Essays, 1972-1980
Richard RORTYÉditeur : University of Minnesota Press - 1982
A Theory of Epistemic Justification
Jarrett LEPLINÉditeur : Springer Science+Business Media B.V. - 2009
Wittgenstein and the Practice of Philosophy
Michael HYMERSÉditeur : Broadview Press - 2010
Contextualist Approaches to Epistemology: Problems and Prospects
Elke BRENDEL, Christoph JÄGERSous la direction de Hans ROTTDans Erkenntnis - 2004
Skepticism, Information, and Closure: Dretskes Theory of Knowledge
Christoph JÄGERSous la direction de Hans ROTTDans Erkenntnis - 2004
Inferential Contextualism, Epistemological Realism and Scepticism: Comments on Williams
Thomas GRUNDMANNSous la direction de Hans ROTTDans Erkenntnis - 2004
Scepticisme et sémiologie médicale
Pierre PELLEGRINSous la direction de Régis MORELON, Ahmad HASNAWIDans De Zénon d’Élée à Poincaré : recueil d’études en hommage à Roshdi Rashed - 2004
Greco on Scepticism – A Critical Discussion
Duncan PRITCHARD, Cornelis VAN PUTTENSous la direction de Hans ROTTDans Erkenntnis - 2005
Russell et la possibilité du scepticisme
Christopher HOOKWAYSous la direction de Dominique WOLTONDans Hermès - 1990
Alain BOYERSous la direction de Pierre JACOBDans L’Âge de la science. Lectures philosophiques - 1989
Empirisme et scepticisme dans la philosophie des sciences en Grande-Bretagne aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles
Frédéric BRAHAMISous la direction de Pierre WAGNERDans Les Philosophes et la science - 2002
Wittgenstein et la science : au-delà des mythologies
Sandra LAUGIERSous la direction de Pierre WAGNERDans Les Philosophes et la science - 2002
Scepticisme et épistémologie externaliste
Thomas BALDWINSous la direction de Daniel ANDLER, Pierre JACOB, Joëlle PROUST, François RÉCANATI, Dan SPERBERDans Épistémologie et cognition - 1992
Empiricism and Its Roots in the Ancient Medical Tradition
Anik WALDOWSous la direction de Charles T. WOLFE, Ofer GALDans The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge. Embodied Empiricism in Early Modern Science - 2010
A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism. Knowing the Unobservable
Anjan CHAKRAVARTTYÉditeur : Cambridge University Press - 2007
Group Rationality in Scientific Research
Husain SARKARÉditeur : Cambridge University Press - 2007
Pierre Gassendi and the Birth of Early Modern Philosophy
Antonia LOLORDOÉditeur : Cambridge University Press - 2006
Mersenne et la philosophie baconienne en France à l’époque de Descartes
Claudio BUCCOLINISous la direction de Élodie CASSANDans Bacon et Descartes - 2014
The authors provide a comprehensive treatment of the major questions of epistemology in an intelligible and non-partisan way, while at the same time exhibiting full knowledge of contemporary publications. Rather than offering an eclectic treatment of disparate problems, the merits of the many different types of approach to epistemology are clearly explained and judiciously assessed. Cartesian and Humean scepticism are also carefully described and distinguished, and fuller treatment than usual is given of rational belief and of Gettier’s problem. – Chapter I, Scepticism and certainty (Introduction; Descartes and Hume; The appeal to ordinary language; The grounds of uncertainty; Basic knowledge); – Chapter II, Belief (Theories of belief; Belief as mental act; Belief behavioural disposition; Belief as mental state); – Chapter III, The analysis of knowledge (Kinds of knowledge; The Platonic definition of knowledge: Is knowledge analysable ?; The truth conditions of knowing; Alternative approaches; The Gettier problem; Defeasibility and causality); – Chapter IV, Perception (The common sense view of perception; The argument from illusion; Sense data; Primary and secondary qualities; The phenomenalist alternative; The realist alternative; Sensing and perceiving); – Chapter V, Memory (The ways of remembering; The representative theory of memory; The role of imagery; The realist theory of memory; Memory, perception, and scepticism; Are perception and memory necessarily reliable ?; The concept of the past; Conclusion); – Chapter VI, A priori knowledge (Knowing without experience; Some distinctions; Theories of the A priori; Scepticism and the A priori; Critics of analyticity); – Chapter VII, Truth (Theories of truth; Correspondence as the nature of truth; The semantic theory; Redundancy theories).– Concluding remarks. – Bibliography p. 204-208. M.-M. V.
Rorty has collected a selection from his vast number of essays under the title Consequences of Pragmatism. Spanning the time range of his work from the early 1970s to the early 1980s, they represent Rorty's development and exposition of his views after he made the sudden turn from analytic philosophy to his anti-essentialist pragmatism. Many of the essays are meant to explain how his view contrasts with the tradition in philosophy he is arguing against, which he identifies as the Cartesian-Kantian one, as well as the analytic philosophical tradition he used to belong to. However, some of the later essays also serve to defend his views against some common criticisms. Also included are essays which compare his views with those of people working or having worked along similar 'counter-tradition' lines, such as of course his inspiration Dewey, but also Heidegger, Foucault, and Cavell. – Contents : – The world well lost; – Keeping philosophy pure; – Overcoming the tradition; – Professionalized philosophy and transcendentalist culture; – Dewey's metaphysics; – Philosophy as a kind of writing; – Is there a problem about fictional discourse?; – Nineteenth-century idealism and twentieth-century textualism; – Pragmatism, relativism, and irrationalism; – Cavell on skepticism; – Method, social science, and social hope; – Philosophy in America today. M.-M. V.
This book proposes an original theory of epistemic justification that offers a new way to relate justification to the epistemic goal of truth-conducive belief. The theory is based on a novel analysis of reliable belief-formation that answers classic objections to reliability theories in epistemology. The analysis generates a way of distinguishing justified belief from believing justifiedly, such that inerrant belief-formation need not be justificatory whereas systemic deception could be. It thereby respects the intuition that standards for justification must be accessible to the believer, while maintaining the essential connection of justification to truth. The analysis shows how justification relates to, but is distinct from, evidence, rationality, and probability. It provides a unifying treatment of issues central to current debate in epistemology, including epistemic paradoxes, epistemic closure, skepticism, contextualism, virtue theories, the effect of luck on knowledge and justification, the interpretation of subjunctive conditions for justification, the conflict between internalism and externalism, and metaphilosophical evaluation of epistemological theories. There are further applications to metaphysics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science, and ethics. – 1. Introduction. – 2. Truth-conduciveness. – 3. Reliability. – 4. Justification. – 5. Inference. – 6. Epistemic. – 7. Skepticism. – 8. Tracking and Epistemic Luck. – 9. Intellectual Virtue. – 10. Counterexamples. – 11. Intuition and Method. M.-M. V.
Wittgenstein and the Practice of Philosophy introduces Wittgenstein's philosophy to senior undergraduates and graduate students. Its pedagogical premise is that the best way to understand Wittgenstein's thought is to take seriously his methodological remarks. Its interpretive premise is that those methodological remarks are the natural result of Wittgenstein's rejection of his early view of the ground of value, including semantic value or meaning, as something that must lie "outside the world." This metaphysical view of meaning is replaced in his transitional writings with a kind of conventionalism, according to which meaning is made possible by the existence of grammatical conventions that are implicit in our linguistic practices. The implicit nature of these conventions makes us vulnerable to a special kind of confusion that results from lacking a clear view of the norms that underlie our linguistic practices. This special confusion is characteristic of philosophical problems, and the task of philosophy is the therapeutic one of alleviating confusion by helping us to see our grammatical norms clearly. This development of this therapeutic view of philosophy is traced from Wittgenstein's early Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus through his transitional writings and lectures to his great masterwork, Philosophical Investigations, and his final reflections on knowledge and scepticism in On Certainty. Wittgenstein's discussions of naming, family resemblances, rule-following and private language in Philosophical Investigations are all examined as instances of this sort of method, as is his discussion of knowledge in On Certainty. The book concludes by considering some objections to the viability of Wittgenstein's method and speculating on how it might be extended to a discussion of moral value to which Wittgenstein never explicitly returns. – Table of Contents: Acknowledgements; Introduction. – Chapter 1. Philosophy and Science: 1. A Foundation for the Sciences; 2. The Queen of the Sciences; 3. Philosophy as an Underlabourer to the Sciences; 4. Locke, the Underlabourer; 5. Philosophy as Logic: Russell; 6. Philosophy as Logic: The Vienna Circle; 7. Quine's Naturalism. – Chapter 2. Philosophy and Science in the Tractatus: 1. The Tractatus; 2. Facts and Propositions; 3. Analysis and Extensionality; 4. Logical Pictures; 5. Silence; 6. The Transcendental; 7. Saying and Showing; 8.Philosophy as an Activity; 9. Russell and Wittgenstein. – Chapter 3. After the Tractatus: 1. Certainty in a Time of Doubt; 2. The Demise of Logical Atomism; 3. Verification for a While; 4. Whistling in the Dark; 5. Implicit Conventions; 6. The Synopsis of Trivialities; 7. Tidying Up; 8. Lost in the City; 9. Against Explanation; 10. Illusion, Weakness, Illness, Therapy; 11. Farewell to Philosophy? – Chapter 4. Language without Essence: 1. Language-games; 2. Learning Names; 3. Analysis and Bearerless Names; 4. Proper Names; 5. Meaning and Use; 6. From Necessary Objects to Contingent Conventions; 7. The Multiplicity of Language-Games; 8. The Problem of Universals; 9. Beyond Realism and Nominalism; 10. The Family of Numbers; 11. The Voices of the Investigations. – Chapter 5. Rules and Private Language: 1. Kripke's Puzzle; 2. Kripke's "Sceptical Solution"; 3. Contra Kripke; 4. Kripke on Private Language; 5. Some Arguments against Private Language; 6. A Refutation of the Possibility of Private Language?; 7. "Robinson Crusoe"; 8. Expressivism; 9. Other Minds. – Chapter 6. Scepticism, Knowledge, and Justification: 1. Moorean Propositions and Sceptical Doubts; 2. Definitive Refutation?; 3. Reminders and Diagnoses; 4. 'I know'; 5. Doubt Requires Certainty; 6. Contextualism; 7. The Riverbed of Thought; 8. The Hard Rock of the Riverbed; 9. Back to the Tractatus? – Chapter 7. Objections and Extrapolations: 1. Farewell to Philosophy?; 2. Ordinary Language Philosophy; 3. Quietism and Pessimism; 4. Conservatism; 5. How General Is Wittgenstein's Method?; 6. Wittgenstein's Silence about Ethics; 7. Ethical Concepts and Family Resemblances; 8. Wittgenstein and Quine. M.-M. V.
In this paper we survey some main arguments for and against epistemological contextualism. We distinguish and discuss various kinds of contextualism, such as attributer contextualism (the most influential version of which is semantic, conversational, or radical contextualism); indexicalism; proto-contextualism; Wittgensteinian contextualism; subject, inferential, or issue contextualism; epistemic contextualism; and virtue contextualism. Starting with a sketch of Dretskes Relevant Alternatives Theory and Nozicks Tracking Account of Knowledge, we reconstruct the history of various forms of contextualism and the ways contextualists try to handle some notorious epistemological quandaries, especially skepticism and the lottery paradox. Then we outline the most important problems that contextualist theories face, and give overviews of their criticisms and defenses as developed in this issue.
According to Fred Dretske’s externalist theory of knowledge a subject knows that p if and only if she believes that p and this belief is caused or causally sustained by the information that p. Another famous feature of Dretske’s epistemology is his denial that knowledge is closed under known logical entailment. The author argues that, given Dretske’s construal of information, he is in fact committed to the view that both information and knowledge are closed under known entailment. This has far-reaching consequences. For if it is true that, as Dretske also believes, accepting closure leads to skepticism, he must either embrace skepticism or abandon his information theory of knowledge. The latter alternative would seem to be preferable. But taking this route would deprive one of the most powerfully developed externalist epistemologies of its foundation.
In this paper I will discuss Michael Williams’s inferential contextualism – a position that must be carefully distinguished from the currently more fashionable attributer contextualism. I will argue that Williams’s contextualism is not stable, though it avoids some of the shortcomings of simple inferential contextualism. In particular, his criticism of epistemological realism cannot be supported on the basis of his own account. I will also argue that we need not give up epistemological realism in order to provide a successful diagnosis of scepticism.
I. La fondation philosophique de l’empirisme : Bacon; II. La pratique expérimentale : autour de la Royal Society; III. De la philosophie expérimentale à l’anthropologie : Hume.
I. Le langage, la science et la métaphysique : Sinn; Le non-sens et le vouloir-dire; Proposition, pensée et vérification; La métaphysique et le transcendantal; II. Les hypothèses : expérience, scepticisme et réalisme; Hypothèses et propositions; Phénomène, expérience et scepticisme; III. Les règles, le transcendantal et le naturalisme : Du transcendantal à la seconde philosophie; Kripgenstein; Accord et donné; IV. La psychologie, la science, la philosophie.
Thomas Baldwin examine ici la façon dont l’épistémologie externaliste et naturaliste traite les doutes sceptiques traditionnels. Il soutient que pour donner aux doutes sceptiques le sens qui leur revient, il convient d’adjoindre à l’épistémologie naturalisée ce qu’il appelle le «naturalisme épistémologique» des philosophes du sens commun (Hume, Reid, Wittgenstein) qui soulignent l’irrésistible spontanéité de la formation des croyances ordinaires.
Kant introduces empiricism as a deficient position that is unsuitable for the generation of scientific knowledge. The reason for this is that, according to him, empiricism fails to connect with the world by remaining trapped within the realm of appearances. If we follow Galen’s account of the debate ensuing among Hellenistic doctors in the third century B.C., empiricism presents itself in an entirely different light. It emerges as a position that criticises medical practitioners who stray away from the here and now by indulging in theory-driven a priori forms of reasoning. In so doing empiricism remains at all times committed to the world and its agents. In this paper Galen’s account of empiricism will serve as a means to unravel the dynamics of a discussion that aims to reassess the standards of a dogmatic scientific practice. By looking at Bacon’s and Gassendi’s perception of the ancient medical tradition, this paper will furthermore show that the understanding of what empiricism is crucially depends on the understanding of what scepticism is.
Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories give approximately true descriptions of both observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent world. Debates between realists and their critics are at the very heart of the philosophy of science. Anjan Chakravartty traces the contemporary evolution of realism by examining the most promising strategies adopted by its proponents in response to the forceful challenges of antirealist sceptics, resulting in a positive proposal for scientific realism today. He examines the core principles of the realist position, and sheds light on topics including the varieties of metaphysical commitment required, and the nature of the conflict between realism and its empiricist rivals. By illuminating the connections between realist interpretations of scientific knowledge and the metaphysical foundations supporting them, his book offers a compelling vision of how realism can provide an internally consistent and coherent account of scientific knowledge. – Contents : – Part I. Scientific Realism Today: – 1. Realism and antirealism, metaphysics and empiricism; – 2. Selective scepticism: entity realism, structural realism, semirealism; – 3. Properties, particulars and concrete structures; – Part II. Metaphysical Foundations: – 4. Causal realism and causal processes; – 5. Dispositions, property identity and laws of nature; – 6. Sociability: natural and scientific kinds; – Part III. Theory Meets World: – 7. Representing and describing: theories and models; – 8. Approximate truths about approximate truth. – Includes bibliographical references (p. 235-243) and Index.
Under what conditions is a group of scientists rational? How would rational scientists collectively agree to make their group more effective? What sorts of negotiations would occur among them and under what conditions? What effect would their final agreement have on science and society? These questions have been central to the philosophy of science for the last two decades. In this 2007 book, Husain Sarkar proposes answers to them by building on classical solutions - the skeptical view, two versions of the subjectivist view, the objectivist view, and the view of Hilary Putnam. Although he finds these solutions not completely adequate, Sarkar retrieves what is of value from them and also expropriates the arguments of John Rawls and Amartya Sen, in order to weave a richer, deeper, and more developed theory of group rationality. – Contents : – 1. The overview : – I. The plan of the book; – II. Group to individual, or vice vera?; – III. The Williams problem and utopias. – 2. Group rationality : a unique problem : – I. Not an evolution problem; – II. Not a game theory problem; – III. Ramsey and group rationality. – 3. The problem explored : Sen’s way : – I. Consistency, ordering, and rationality; – II. Other notions of rationality and scientific welfare; – III. The sen-problems of group rationality; – IV. The problem defined. – 4. – The skeptical view : – I. The democratic councils; – II. No covenant, a tale; – III. Multiply, multiply, multiply; – IV. Positive arguments; – V. Negative arguments; – VI. The route to the goal. – 5. The subjectivist view I : – Individuals, group, and goals; – II. Divisions and discrepancies; – III. A society of ruthless egoists; – IV. Theory choice; – V. Problems and a paradox. – 6. The subjectivist view II : – I. Values and individuals; – II. Group transitions and risk distribution; – III. History, values, and representative groups; – IV. Negotiations in the scientists’ original position; – V. The city of man? – 7. The objectivist view : – I. Two objectivist problems; – II. Toward the best available method; – III. The best available method; – IV. Is the single method sufficient?; – V. A new problem of demarcation; – VI. Illustration : the herbalist tradition; – VII. The scare of Saint-Simon. – 8. Putnam, individual rationality, and Peirce’s puzzle : – I. Democracy and group rationality; – II. Moral images, scientific images; – III. Method, historical knowledge, and reason; – IV. Peirce’s puzzle; – V. Ultimately, relativism?; – VI. What lies at Bedrock. – 9. The nine problems : – I. The problem, the common aim of science, and the basic structure; – II. The council, reasoning, and allegiance; – III. The universal law of rationality, the worth of science and utopias. – Includes bibliographical references (p. 267-274) and indexes.
This book offers a comprehensive treatment of the philosophical system of the seventeenth-century philosopher Pierre Gassendi. Gassendi's importance is widely recognized and is essential for understanding early modern philosophers and scientists such as Locke, Leibniz and Newton. Offering a systematic overview of his contributions, LoLordo situates Gassendi's views within the context of sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century natural philosophy as represented by a variety of intellectual traditions, including scholastic Aristotelianism, Renaissance Neo-Platonism, and the emerging mechanical philosophy. LoLordo's work will be essential reading for historians of early modern philosophy and science. – Contents : – Introduction. – 1. Gassendi's life and times; – 2. Gassendi's philosophical opponents; – 3. Skepticism, perception and the truth of the appearances; – 4. Cognition, knowledge and the theory of signs; – 5. Space and time; – 6. Atoms and causes; – 7. Bodies and motion; – 8. Generation, life and the corporeal soul; – 9. The metaphysics of body; – 10. Faith, reason and the immaterial soul. – Includes bibliographical references (p. 253-271) and index.
Claude Buccolini analyse la réception de Bacon par Mersenne, qui dans un premier temps est très critique vis-à-vis de l’auteur anglais, rangé parmi les hérétiques et les sceptiques. Mais Mersenne nuance son jugement, après une lecture plus approfondie des œuvres, et s’intéresse aux nouvelles expériences développées par Bacon. Sa fascination pour les expérimentations baconiennes va alors infléchir le sens de sa philosophie, sans le transformer pour autant. H. V.
Claude Buccolini analyses the reception of Bacon in Mersenne’s work. Mersenne starts to criticize Bacon, considering him as a heretic and a sceptic. But after having studied more precisely his work, he takes a specific interest concerning his experiences. His fascination for Bacon’s experimentations influences his philosophy, without deeply changing it. H. V.