Le présent ouvrage est issu du 1er congrès de la Société de Philosophie des Sciences, organisé les 21 et 22 janvier 2005 à Paris, avec le soutien de l’École Normale Supérieure, de l’Institut d’Histoire et Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques (IHPST) et de l’École doctorale de philosophie de l’Université de Paris1 – Panthéon-Sorbonne. Il ne s’agit pas ici des Actes de ce congrès, mais d’une sélection de communications choisies pour éclairer, sinon les épuiser, les questions que soulève la relation d’une totalité (système, milieu, groupe, organisme, etc.) aux éléments qui la composent (individus, organes, molécules, etc.). [Voir dépouillement des articles]. M.-M. V.

The relation between scientific knowledge and common knowledge is a relatively new philosophical problem; it emerged with the rapid development of empirical science based on mathematics and experimental methods. One of by-products of that development is scientific realism claiming that the world is such as science reveals it to us. However if the world is as science presents it, then, what is the value of common knowledge and what role does common knowledge play in human cognitive activity ? Another question is whether common knowledge precedes in any significant sense scientific knowledge, or is it merely a guide to some of our daily activities with no relation to scientific cognition ? Perhaps it is a burden which, if possible, should be discarded as it makes gain knowledge of what the world is really like difficult. Is it possible that the very question about the relation between scientific knowledge and common knowledge is for some reasons ill-formulated and has no sense whatsoever? The aim of the present book is to search for answers to those questions. M.-M. V.

In this chapter, it is argued that Karl Popper was a communitarian philosopher. This will surprise some readers. Liberals often tout Popper as one of their champions. Indeed, there is no doubt that Popper shared much in common with liberals. However, it will be argued that Popper rejected a central, though perhaps not essential, pillar of liberal theory, namely, individualism. This claim may seem to contradict Popper's professed methodological individualism. Yet this paper argues that Popper was a methodological individualist in name only. In fact, methodological individualism faded from Popper's vocabulary as he moved institutions and situational analysis more firmly to centre-stage. Popper's focus on institutions and situations constitutes what is called his communitarianism. If this interpretation is correct, then theorists in the sociology of scientific knowledge and communitarian epistemology should reconsider their long-standing distrust of Popper's philosophy. Indeed, they may have much to gain by treating Popper as a friend rather than a foe.

This paper deals with the problem of epistemic circularity to which it proposes a solution that is based on an account of common sense inspired by one branch of virtue epistemology. It explains why there is no need to be afraid of the notion of self-confidence in epistemology, and shows that a strong distinction between common knowledge and scientific knowledge may be seen as mistaken. The postulation of a profound division between these two kinds of knowledge has been a French speciality in recent years, inspired by Gaston Bachelard’s notion of an «epistemological break». This distinction is disputable in the epistemological perspective favored by Roger Pouivet.

There is a dynamic interdependence between those two kinds of human knowledge : common knowledge and scientific knowledge. First, scientific knowledge is dependent on common knowledge, which is its source and support. Second, scientific knowledge is more effective and reliable and in this limited sense superior to common knowledge. Scientific knowledge provides intellectual enrichment and leads to technological advances. Third, applied and popularized scientific knowledge is taught at schools and partly incorporated into common and technical knowledge (development). But, fourth, common knowledge is the ground to supervise the consequences of science to avoid adverse effects like environmental degradation. Common knowledge is usually the ground for our activities, so it also supervise scientific practices.

Cet ouvrage rassemble sept textes, inédits en français ou devenus difficiles à trouver, qui résument pour les scientifiques comme pour le public peu au fait de la biologie les travaux théoriques de Jacques Monod, ainsi que sa réflexion éthique. Cet ensemble original complète et développe de nombreux propos énoncés dans son précédent ouvrage, Le Hasard et la nécessité. Essai sur la philosophie naturelle de la biologie moderne (Paris : Éditions du Seuil, 1970). Il permettra à chacun de se familiariser avec des recherches qui ont profondément transformé la médecine et la biologie modernes. Ces essais permettent de comprendre la place essentielle de la recherche scientifique dans le dynamisme d’une société et dans le processus universel de la connaissance du monde vivant. – 1. «Information, induction, répression dans la biosynthèse d’un enzyme». Xe Colloque de la Société pour la chimie physiobiologique. Mosbach (République fédérale d’Allemagne), 9-12 avril 1959 ; – 2. «Sur le mode d’action des gènes et leur régulation». Communication présentée à la Semaine d’études sur le problème des macromolécules d’intérêt biologique de l’Académie pontificale des sciences, en 1962 ; – 3. «Remarques conclusives du colloque Basic Problems in Neoplastic Disease». Extrait des Actes du Symposium of Basic Problems in Neoplastic Disease, publiés sous la direction d’Alfred Gellhorn et E. Hirschberg. New York : Columbia University Press, 1962. Traduit de l’anglais par Marie-Brigitte Foster ; – 4. «De l’adaptation enzymatique aux transitions allostériques». Conférence Nobel, prononcée le 11 décembre 1965. © Fondation Nobel, 1966 ; – 5. «Symétrie et fonction dans les systèmes biologiques». Conférence lors des Rencontres Nobel 11 (Symmetry and Function of Biological Systems at the Macromolecular Level). © Fondation Nobel, 1969. Traduit de l’anglais par Marie-Brigitte Foster ; – 6. «La science et ses valeurs». Conférence lors des Rencontres Nobel 14 (The Place of Value in a World of Facts). © Fondation Nobel, 1970. Traduit de l’anglais par Marie-Brigitte Foster ; – 7. «De la biologie moléculaire à l’éthique de la connaissance». Leçon inaugurale prononcée le vendredi 3 novembre 1967 au Collège de France.

«There are three main streams of thought which are relevant to the theme of this enquiry; they may, with sufficient accuracy, be termed the scientific, the mathematical, and the philosophical movements. Modern speculative physics with its revolutionary theories concerning the natures of matter and of electricity has made urgent the question, What are the ultimate data of science? It is in accordance with the nature of things that mankind should find itself acting and should then proceed to discuss the rationale of its activities. Thus the creation of science precedes the analysis of its data and can even be accompanied by the acceptance of faulty analyses, though such errors end by warping scientific imagination» (p. V). – Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) was a prominent English mathematician and philosopher who co-authored the highly influential Principia Mathematica with Bertrand Russell. Considered the "high water mark of his philosophical achievement", Whitehead's book is a rigorous inquiry into the data of science. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge ranks among Whitehead's most important works; forming a perspective on scientific observation that incorporated a complex view of experience, rather than prioritising the position of 'pure' sense data. Alongside companion volumes The Concept of Nature (1920) and The Principle of Relativity (1922), it created a framework for Whitehead's later metaphysical speculations. This is an important book that will be of value to anyone with an interest in the relationship between science and philosophy. – Contents : – Part I. The Traditions of Science: – 1. Meaning; – 2. The foundations of dynamical physics; – 3. Scientific relativity; – 4. Congruence; – Part II. The Data of Science: – 5. The natural elements; – 6. Events; – 7. Objects; – Part III. The Method of Extensive Abstraction: – 8. Principles of the method of extensive abstraction; – 9. Durations, moments and time-systems; – 10. Finite abstractive elements; – 11. Points and straight lines; – 12. Normality and congruence; – 13. Motion; Part IV. The Theory of Objects: – 14. The location of objects; – 15. Material objects; – 16. Causal components; 17. Figures; – 18. Rhythms. – Notes.